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Abstract. Mobile communication plays a more and more important
role in computer networks. How to authenticate a new connecting ad-
dress belonging to a said mobile node is one of the key issues in mobile
networks. This paper analyzes the Return Routability (RR) protocol
and proposes an improved security solution for the RR protocol without
changing its architecture. With the improvement, three types of redirect
attacks can be prevented.
Keywords: Authentication, Redirect Attacks, Security, MIPv6.
1 Introduction
Mobile networking technologies, along with the proliferation of numerous
portable and wireless devices, promise to change people’s perceptions of the In-
ternet. In true mobile networking, communications activities are not disrupted
when a user changes his/her device’s point of attachment to the Internet - all
the network reconnections occur automatically and transparently to the user.
The IETF RFC 3775 [1] supports mobile networking by allowing a mobile node
to be addressed by two IP addresses, a home address and a care-of address. The
former is an IP address assigned to the mobile node within its subnet preﬁx on
its home subnet and the latter is a temporary address acquired by the mobile
node while visiting a foreign subnet. The dual address mechanism in Mobile IP
network allows packets to be routed to the mobile node regardless of its current
point of attachment and the movement of the mobile node away from its home
subnet is transparent to transport and higher-layer protocols. Fig 1 shows the
basic operation in mobile IPv6.
One of the major features in Mobile IPv6 is the support for “Route Optimiza-
tion” as a built-in fundamental part of the Mobile IPv6 protocol. The integration
of route optimization functionality allows direct routing from any correspondent
node (CN) to any mobile node (MN), without needing to pass through the mo-
bile node’s home sub-net and be forwarded by its home agent (HA), and thus
eliminates the problem of “triangle routing”. Route optimization in Mobile IPv6
requires that the MN , HA and the CNs maintain a Binding Cache. A binding
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Fig. 1. Basic operation in mobile IPv6
is the association of a MN ’s home address (HoA) with a care-of address (CoA)
for that mobile node, along with the remaining lifetime of that association. A
mobile node uses Binding Update (BU) messages to notify its CNs or its HA
of its current binding. Unfortunately, unauthenticated binding update messages
provide intruders with an easy means to launch “Redirect Attacks”, i.e., mali-
cious acts which redirect traﬃc from the correspondent nodes to destinations
chosen by intruders. Therefore, security of the binding update messages is of
para-mount importance for Mobile IPv6 to meet its basic security requirements.
In IETF RFC 3775 [1], the Return Routability protocol (RR) is deployed to
secure binding updates from MN to CNs. The basic RR mechanism consists of
two checks, a home address check and a care-of-address check.
In the paper, we will analyze the RR mechanism and point out three attacks
to the RR protocol, and ﬁnally propose a solution without changing the RR
architecture.
The notations used throughout this paper are listed below:
h( ) a one-way hash function, such as SHA1 [2].
prf(k, m) a keyed pseudo random function - often a keyed hash func-
tion [3]. It accepts a secret key k and a message m, and generates a
pseudo random output. This function is used for both message au-
thentication and cryptographic key derivations.
e(k ,m) encryption of message m with a secret key k.
m|n concatenation of two messages m and n.
MN mobile node HA home agent of a mobile node.
CN correspondent node of a mobile node.
CNA IP address of CN .
HoA home address of a mobile node.
CoA MN ’s care-of address when it visits a foreign network.
2 Brief Review of RR Protocol
In RFC 3775’s Return Routability (RR) protocol [1], a CN keeps a secret key
kCN and generates a nonce at regular intervals, say every few minutes. CN uses
the same key kCN and nonce with all the mobile nodes it is in communication
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with, so that it does not need to generate and store a new nonce when a new
mobile node contacts it. Each nonce is identiﬁed by a nonce index. When a new
nonce is generated, it must be associated with a new nonce index, e.g., j. CN
keeps both the current value of Nj and a small set of previous nonce values,
Nj−1, Nj−2, . Older values are discarded, and messages using them will be re-
jected as replays. Message exchanges in the RR protocol are shown in Fig 2,
where the HoTI (Home Test Init) and CoTI (Care-of Test Init) messages are
sent to CN by a mobile node MN simultaneously. The HoT (Home Test) and
CoT (Care-of Test) are replies from CN . All RR protocol messages are sent
as IPv6 “Mobility Header” in IPv6 packets. In the representation of a protocol
message, we will use the ﬁrst two ﬁelds to denote source IP address and desti-
nation IP address, respectively. We will use CNA to denote the IP address of
the correspondent node CN .
MN CN HA
Home Test Init (HoTI)
Care-of Test Init (CoTI)
Home Test (HoT)
Care-of Test (CoT)
Fig. 2. Return Routability protocol
When MN wants to perform route optimization, it sends
HoTI = {HoA,CNA, rH}
and
CoTI = {CoA,CNA, rC}
to CN , where rH and rC are random values used to match responses with
requests. HoTI tells MN ’s home address HoA to CN . It is reverse tunneled
through the home agent HA, while CoTI informs MN ’s care-of address CoA
and is sent directly to CN .
When CN receives HoTI, it takes the source IP address of HoTI as input
and generates a home keygen token
KTH = prf(kCN , HoA|Nj |0)
and replies MN with
HoT = {CNA,HoA, rH ,KTH , j},
where | denotes concatenation and the ﬁnal “0” inside the pseudo random func-
tion is a single zero octet, used to distinguish home and care-of cookies from
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each other. The index j is carried along to allow CN later eﬃciently ﬁnding the
nonce value Nj that it used in creating the token KTH . Similarly, when CN
receives CoTI, it takes the source IP address of CoTI as input and generates a
care-of keygen token
KTC = prf(kCN , CoA|Ni|1)
and sends
CoT = {CNA,CoA, rC ,KTC , i}
to MN , where the ﬁnal “1” inside the pseudo random function is a single octet
“0x01”. Note that HoT is sent via MN ’s home agent HA while CoT is delivered
directly to MN .
When MN receives both HoT and CoT , it hashes together the two tokens to
form a session key
kBU = h(KTH |KTC),
which is then used to authenticate the correspondent binding update message
to CN :
BU = {CoA,CNA,HoA, Seq#, i, j,MACBU},
where Seq# is a sequence number used to detect replay attack and
MACBU = prf(kBU , CoA|CNA|HoA|Seq#|i|j)
is a message authentication code (MAC) protected by the session key kBU .
MACBU is used to ensure that BU was sent by the same node which received
both HoT and CoT . The message BU contains j and i, so that CN knows which
nonce values Nj and Ni to use to ﬁrst recompute KTH and KTC and then
the session key kBU . Note that CN is stateless until it receives BU and veriﬁes
MAC. If MAC is veriﬁed positive, CN may reply with a binding acknowledge-
ment message
BA = {CNA,CoA,HoA, Seq#,MACBA},
where Seq# is copied from the BUCN message and
MACBA = prf(kBU , CNA|CoA|HoA|Seq#)
is a MAC generated using kBU to authenticate the BA message. CN then creates
a binding cache entry for the mobile node MN . The binding cache entry binds
HoA with CoA which allows future packets to MN be sent to CoA directly.
An example implementation of the binding cache at CN is shown in Fig 3,
where HoA is used as an index for searching the binding cache, the sequence
number Seq# is used by CN to check the freshness of binding updates. Each
binding update sent by MN must use a Seq# greater than (modulo 216) the
one sent in the previous binding update with the same HoA. It is not required,
however, that the sequence number value strictly increase by 1 with each new
binding update sent or received [1]. Note that the session key kBU is not kept
in the cache entry. When CN receives a binding update message, based on the
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  Entry for MN:  HoA,  CoA,  Seq#
  Entries for other mobile nodes
 kCN, Nj, Nj-1, Nj-2
Fig. 3. A binding cache implementation at CN in the RR protocol
nonce indexes i and j in the message, it recomputes the session key using kCN
and the list of the most recent nonce values, say {Nj, Nj−1, Nj−2}, and then
veriﬁes BU using the newly computed session key.
The mobile node MN maintains a Binding Update List for each binding
update message sent by it, for which the lifetime has not yet expired. A binding
update list for a correspondent node CN consists of CNA, MN ’s HoA and
CoA, the remaining lifetime of the binding, the maximum value of the sequence
number sent in previous binding updates to CN and the session key kBU .
3 Redirect Attacks to RR Protocol
Obviously, the RR protocol protects binding updates against intruders who are
unable to monitor the HA-CN path and the MN-CN path simultaneously. How-
ever, one has no reason to assume that an intruder will monitor one link and
not the other, especially when the intruder knows that monitoring a given link is
particularly eﬀective to expedite its attack. Even worse, we demonstrate that the
RR protocol can be attacked under its original assumption of no simultaneous
monitor of both the HA-CN path and the MN-CN path.
3.1 Session Hijacking Attacks
Let’s consider the scenarios showed in Fig 4, a mobile node MN1 is communicat-
ing with a correspondent node CN . An intruder sends a forged binding update
message (or replays an old binding update message) to CN , claiming that MN1
has moved to a new care-of-address belonging to a node MN2. If CN accepts
the fake binding update, it will redirect to MN2 all packets that are intended
to MN1. This attack allows the intruder to hijack ongoing connections between
MN1 and CN or start new connections with CN pretending to be MN1. This
is an “outsider” attack since the intruder tries to redirect other nodes’ traﬃc.
Such an attack may result in information leakage, impersonation of the mobile
node MN1 or ﬂooding of MN2.
This attack is serious because MN1,MN2, CN and the intruder can be any
nodes anywhere on the Internet. All the intruder needs to know is the IP ad-
dresses of MN1 and CN . Since there is no structural diﬀerence between a mobile
node home address and a stationary IP address, the attack works as well against
stationary Internet nodes as against mobile nodes. The deployment of a bind-
ing update protocol without security could result in breakdown of the entire
Internet [4].
In the case of the static IPv6 without mobility (which is equivalent to the
mobile node MN at its home subnet in Mobile IPv6), to succeed in the attack,
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the intruder must be constantly present on the CN-HA path. In order to redirect
CN ’s traﬃc intended for MN to a malicious node, the intruder most likely has
to get control of a router or a switch along the CN-HA path. Furthermore, after
taking over the session from MN , if the malicious node wants to continue the
session with CN while pretending to be MN , the malicious node and the router
need to collaborate throughout the session. For example, the router tunnels CN ’s
traﬃc to the malicious node and vise versa.
MN1
MN2
Intruder
CN
Fig. 4. Session hijacking attacks
In the case of Mobile IPv6, the eﬀort committed to break the RR protocol
to launch a session hijacking attack could be considerably lesser. Assume that
MN1 and CN are having an on-going communication session and the intruder
wants to redirect CN ’s traﬃc to his collaborator MN2. The intruder monitors
the CN-HA path (i.e., anywhere from MN1’s home network to CN ’s network)
to obtain HoT , extracts the home keygen token KTH and sends it to MN2.
Upon receiving KTH ,MN2 sends a CoTI to CN and CN will reply with a
care-of keygen token KTC . MN2 simply hashes the two keygen tokens to obtain
a valid binding key, and uses the key to send a binding update message to CN
on behalf of MN1. The binding update will be accepted by CN which will in
turn direct its traﬃc to MN2.
3.2 Movement Halting Attacks
Another related attack is when a mobile node MN rapidly moves from one care-
of ad-dress CoA to another CoA’. Since MN runs the RR protocol whenever
it moves to a new location, an intruder can intercept the care-of keygen token
KTC in the current RR session and the home keygen token KTH in the next RR
session, hash the two keygen tokens to get a valid binding key, and then send a
binding update message with the CoA in the current session to the correspondent
node. The correspondent node will still send its traﬃc back to CoA. Hence, MN ,
which has moved to CoA’, will not receive data from the correspondent node.
Note that in this attack the attacker does not have to intercept the two keygen
tokens at the “same time”.
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3.3 Traﬃc Permutation Attacks
The RR protocol is also subject to a “traﬃc permutation” attack. Consider
a correspondent node which provides on-line services to many mobile clients
(Fig 5). An intruder can simply eavesdrop on the RR protocol messages to collect
keygen tokens on the border between the correspondent node and the Internet.
The intruder then hashes random pairs of keygen tokens to form binding keys,
and sends binding update messages to the correspondent node.
MN1
MN2
Intruder
CN/Server
MN3
Fig. 5. Intruder attacks an on-line server
Such a forged binding update message will be accepted by the correspondent
node with probability 1/4. This will cause redirection of traﬃc to randomly se-
lected mobile clients and eventually bring down the services of the correspondent
node.
4 Improvement of RR Protocol
The attacks outlined in the above section are due to the decoupling of HoA and
CoA in RR messages. In the original RR protocol, the home keygen token
KTH = prf(kCN , HoA|Nj |0)
and the care-of keygen token
KTC = prf(kCN , CoA|Ni|1)
are delivered without any stated relationship. Any pair of home keygen token
and care-of keygen token can generate a valid binding key
kBU = h(KTH |KTC)
as long as the indexes, i and j, are still valid.
However, the attacks described in the above section can be prevented by mod-
ifying the RR protocol to include both CoA and HoA in the generation of home
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keygen token and care-of keygen token, respectively. In the improved RR proto-
col, HoA and CoA are bound together. (The modiﬁed parts are underscored.)
A mobile node sends
HoTI ′ = {HoA,CNA,CoA, rH}
and
CoTI ′ = {CoA,CNA,HoA, rC}
to a CN , which replies with the home keygen token
KT ′H = prf(kCN , HoA|Nj |CoA|0)
and the care-of keygen token
KT ′C = prf(kCN , CoA|Ni|HoA|1).
Then the new binding key
k′BU = h(KT
′
H |KT ′C)
is valid only for the pair of HoA and its claimed CoA. Therefore the misuse of
keygen tokens can be avoided.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁrst reviewed the Return Routability protocol in RFC 3775,
then demonstrated three redirect attacks: Session Hijacking Attacks, Movement
Halting Attacks and Traﬃc Permutation Attacks. We further pointed out that
the attacks are due to the decoupling of HoA and CoA in RR messages. We
also proposed an improved solution that provides much stronger security than
the original RR protocol without changing its architecture.
References
1. D. Johnson, C. Perkins, and J. Arkko, “Mobility Support in IPv6”, IETF RFC 3775,
June 2004.
2. NIST, “Secure Hash Standard”, NIST FIPS PUB 180, May 1993.
3. H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, “HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Messaging
Authentication”, IETF RFC 2104, February 1997.
4. T. Aura, “Mobile IPv6 Security”, Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop
on Security Protocols, LNCS 2467, Cambridge, UK, April 2002.
